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BUT HE DOESN'T LOOK RETARDED: CAPITAL JURY
SELECTION FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED
CLIENT NOT EXCLUDED AFTER
ATKINS V. VIRGINIA
Andrea D. Lyon*
INTRODUCTION
Jury selection in a capital case is a daunting prospect.' One has to
keep in mind the likelihood of overwhelming negative publicity,2 the
horrendous nature of the crime,3 the sometimes competing strategies
of trial and mitigation, 4 and general hostility toward capital defend-
ants, who are often minorities, nearly universally impoverished, and
frequently viewed at the outset as guilty and bad.5 Add to these ob-
stacles trying to select a jury that can listen to and give effect to miti-
gating circumstances 6-particularly regarding mental retardation-
and a capital defender is facing an enormous challenge.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia that it
is unconstitutional to execute persons with mental retardation, 7 the
* Andrea D. Lyon is the Associate Dean for Clinical Programs, a Clinical Professor of Law,
and Director of the Center for Justice in Capital Cases at DePaul University College of Law.
The author wishes to thank her research assistant, Jennifer Keys, for her invaluable assistance, as
well as her former co-worker, Ajitha Reddy, now Deputy Director of the International Human
Rights Law Institute at DePaul University College of Law. She also wishes to thank her col-
leagues, Professors L. Song Richardson and Susan Bandes, for their comments, suggestions, and,
most important, their inspiration.
1. Milton v. Procunier, 744 F.2d 1091, 1096 (5th Cir. 1984).
2. See Ellen Marrus & Irene Merker Rosenberg, Roper v. Simmons and Strickland v. Wash-
ington: Dancing with Death, 42 CRIM. L. BULL. 153 (2006); see also Albert W. Alschuler, Cele-
brating Great Lawyering, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 223, 228 (2006) (book review of WELSH S.
WHITE, LITIGATING IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH: DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN CAPITAL CASES
(2006)).
3. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (holding that media coverage created a build up of
prejudice so that the jury could not be impartial); see also Scott E. Sundby, The Death Penalty's
Future: Charting the Crosscurrents of Declining Death Sentences and the McVeigh Factor, 84
TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1934 (2006); Influences on the Jury, 35 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 529,
529 n.1685 (2006).
4. See, e.g., State ex rel. Shannon v. Tahash, 121 N.W.2d 59, 60-61 (Minn. 1963).
5. For a discussion of the effect of race on capital sentencing, see Nancy Levit, Expediting
Death: Repressive Tolerance and Post-Conviction Due Process Jurisprudence in Capital Cases, 59
UMKC L. REV. 55, 60-61 (1990).
6. This is required by Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
7. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
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Court left it to the states to define mental retardation and to remove
those with mental retardation from the pool of death-eligible capital
defendants.8 History teaches that no set of procedures and policies
will remove all capital defendants with mental retardation from that
pool 9 and that attorneys are often left defending them. This Article
explores the challenges of jury selection when that is the case.
First, this Article examines the reluctance of some courts to exempt
defendants from the death penalty under both the pre-Atkins state
statutes and under Atkins itself.10 Second, this Article briefly exam-
ines jury selection in a capital case.1' Third, it explores the intersec-
tion of "death qualification" and hostility to mental health mitigation
in addition to the special jury selection challenges defenders face
when their clients are mentally retarded. 12 Finally, this Article sug-
gests how courts and capital defenders might approach jury selection
when the proposed mitigation includes evidence of mental retarda-
tion.13 Some suggested voir dire questions are appended. 14
II. THE RELUCTANCE OF SOME COURTS TO EXCLUDE
DEFENDANTS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION
This Part describes courts' unwillingness to place defendants with
mental retardation outside the death penalty's reach. It first details
these defendants' failed attempts to show that their exclusion from
capital punishment was proper under pre-Atkins state statutes. 15 This
Part then illustrates their continued but unsuccessful efforts to be ex-
empted from consideration for the death penalty after the Court's de-
cision in Atkins.16
A. Pre-Atkins Struggles
Prior to Atkins, defendants with mental retardation struggled for
death penalty exemption under Atkins-like state statutes. 17 For exam-
ple, in Reams v. State, the defendant was sentenced to death despite
8. Id. at 317.
9. See Hedrick v. True, 443 F.3d 342, 372 (4th Cir. 2006) (Gregory, J., dissenting); see also Hill
v. State, 921 So. 2d 579. 584 (Fla. 2006).
10. See infra notes 15-54 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 55-82 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 83-91 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 92-105 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Appendix.
15. See infra notes 17-40 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 41-54 and accompanying text.
17. It is impossible to know how many defendants with mental retardation were in fact ex-
empted from the death penalty, either pre- or post-Atkins, because appeals from such an exemp-
tion are unlikely.
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his low intelligence level.18 A jury convicted Reams as an accomplice
to another man who shot and killed Turner.1 9 Reams and his co-de-
fendant, Goodwin, waited for someone to drive up to an ATM. 20 The
two men approached Turner's car, and Goodwin shot Turner with a
.32 revolver.21 Reams was only eighteen-years-old when he was sen-
tenced to death. 22 In fact, he had the unfortunate distinction of being
the youngest man on Arkansas's Death Row.23 The Arkansas Su-
preme Court rejected all seven of Reams's contentions on appeal, in-
cluding that, because he was mentally retarded, his execution would
violate the Eighth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and Ar-
kansas law. 24 The court found that Reams's IQ was above 65, which
did not entitle him to "the rebuttable presumption of mental retarda-
tion" prescribed by law, and the court ruled that it need not address
that claim, because Reams had failed to raise mental retardation as an
affirmative defense as required by the Arkansas statute.25
Similarly, in Burgess v. State, an all-white jury convicted and sen-
tenced Burgess to death for malice murder, three counts of armed
robbery, and five counts of kidnapping.26 Burgess and his accomplice,
both African American, approached a white couple entering their
motel room and forced them to lie down while they rummaged
through the room.27 Burgess brandished a gold-plated revolver.2 8
The accomplice stayed in the room while Burgess went into the room
next door.2 9 When the man in the next room refused to lie on the
floor, Burgess fatally shot him in front of his fianc6e and her chil-
dren. 30 The fianc6e's seven-year-old boy picked Burgess out of a
lineup.31 Two hotel robberies also involving two African American
men, one of whom had a gold-plated revolver, took place during the
18. 909 S.W.2d 324 (Ark. 1995).
19. Id. at 326-27.
20. Id. at 326.
21. Id.
22. Ark. Teen to be Executed for Gun Death Near ATM, MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL, Dec. 17,
1993, at A18.
23. Bartholomew Sullivan, Death Row Has Echols; Appeal Soon: State's 2nd Youngest Awaits
Penalty for Child Murders, MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL, Mar. 23, 1994, at B1.
24. Reams, 909 S.W.2d at 326-27 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618).
25. Id. Interestingly, Reams's contention under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), was
also rejected. See Reams, 909 S.W.2d at 327-28.
26. 450 S.E.2d 680 (Ga. 1994).
27. Id. at 686.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 687.
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same period of time.32 Burgess had been paroled from a life sentence
for murder only eight months prior to the motel killing.33
Unsurprisingly, given the egregious nature of the crime, the all-
white jury, and the racial overtones of the case, Burgess was sentenced
to death, and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. 34 As required by
Georgia law at that time, the defense presented evidence of mental
retardation to the jury during the trial on the merits, and the jury was
instructed to return a verdict of "guilty but mentally retarded" if it
found that the defense had met its burden of proving beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant was mentally retarded. 35 Such a
verdict would then preclude death penalty procedures. 36 Burgess,
whose mother was mentally retarded, had an IQ below 60.37 The jury
rejected the guilty but mentally retarded verdict at phase one,38 and
the Georgia Supreme Court rejected Burgess's argument that the jury
should have been instructed that it could choose not to impose death
if it found by a preponderance of the evidence-rather than beyond a
reasonable doubt-that Burgess was mentally retarded. 39 Thus, as a
general matter, in pre-Atkins cases where statutes exempted defend-
ants with mental retardation from execution, not all defendants were
excluded at the trial level. Further, defendants who were denied the
exemption at the trial level continued to be unsuccessful at the appel-
late level. 40
32. Burgess, 450 S.E.2d at 687.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 695-96.
35. Id. at 694.
36. Id. at 694-95 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131).
37. Bill Torpy, Potential Jurors Dropped After Being Contacted by Suspect, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Feb. 4, 1992, at B2.
38. Burgess, 450 S.E.2d at 695.
39. Id.
40. For example, in Rondon v. State, 711 N.E.2d 506 (Ind. 1999), there was a similar holding
on the mental retardation issue, although ultimately the court reversed for a new sentencing
hearing on other grounds. In that case, the defendant was convicted of murder and felony mur-
der for stabbing an eighty-two-year-old man fifteen times and killing him. Id. at 511. Rondon
argued that he was ineligible to receive the death penalty, because he fell within the statutory
exemption for those with mental retardation. Id. at 512. In addition to finding that Rondon was
not mentally retarded, the court concluded that the exemption, which had been codified in 1998,
could not be applied retroactively to his case. Id. (citing IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-50-2-9, 35-36-9-
6). Noting that the Indiana General Assembly specifically mandated a statute of repose for
claims of mental retardation in murder cases tried before July 1, 1994, the court rejected
Rondon's argument that the statute must be applied retroactively in order to comport with equal
protection, due process, and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at
512-15. Although Rondon was not spared the death penalty because of his claim of mental
retardation, the court did remand for a new penalty phase and sentencing hearing based upon
ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase. Id. at 523.
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B. Post-Atkins Struggles
Most post-Atkins cases favor the state on purely procedural
grounds. 41 By finding defendants' Atkins claims procedurally barred,
courts have avoided the difficulty of determining if defendants are in
fact mentally retarded. Those appellate courts that deal substantively
with the issue of mental retardation rarely disturb trial court findings
that defendants were not mentally retarded and regularly dismiss At-
kins claims.42
In Commonwealth v. Williams, while the court did not find the de-
fendant's Atkins claim procedurally barred, it refused to examine his
claim substantively.43 There, a jury found Williams guilty of killing his
wife and sentenced him to death.44 Williams admitted to cutting up
his wife's body with a hacksaw in his basement, and he led police to
her body-save for her hands, feet, and head, which were later found
41. See, e.g., Engram v. State, 200 S.W.3d 367 (Ark. 2004) (refusing to recall death penalty
mandate and reopen case due to finding that the defendant, whose lowest IQ was 76, should
have relied upon the pre-Atkins statute during trial instead of raising an Atkins claim); Bowling
v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 361 (Ky. 2005) (holding that the defendant, who claimed that his
IQ was 74, was procedurally barred from raising an Atkins claim, because the state had a pre-
Atkins statute and he did not raise such a claim at trial); see also In re Hill, 437 F.3d 1080 (11th
Cir. 2006) (finding that the defendant's habeas corpus application, including his Atkins claim,
was time-barred, because he filed it twenty-nine months after the deadline); Yeomans v. State,
898 So. 2d 878 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (reviewing a mental retardation claim under plain error
review, because the issue was not raised at the trial level and holding that it was not plain error
to find that the defendant, whose IQ ranged from 67 to 83, was not mentally retarded); Bishop v.
State, 882 So. 2d 135 (Miss. 2004) (denying an Atkins claim, because the defendant did not meet
state requirements for a hearing on the issue of mental retardation; the defendant had only
attached a school record and relatives' affidavits discussing his low intelligence instead of the
required expert report); Branch v. State, 882 So. 2d 36 (Miss. 2004) (finding that an Atkins claim
was procedurally barred, because it was not raised at trial and concluding that the defendant
failed to meet the criteria for mental retardation, despite evidence of an IQ test administered at
age five showing that the defendant was mildly mentally retarded).
42. See, e.g., Conaway v. Polk, 453 F.3d 567 (4th Cir. 2006) (rejecting an Atkins claim, despite
evidence that the defendant scored 68 on an IQ test at age thirty-four, because state law required
low intelligence to be shown prior to age eighteen for the defendant to be considered mentally
retarded); Coulter v. State, 227 S.W.3d 904 (Ark. 2006) (denying the defendant's petition to
recall death sentence mandate, because testimony offered at trial showed that his IQ was 94);
Gray v. State, 887 So. 2d 158 (Miss. 2004) (denying the defendant's Atkins claim and holding that
he was not entitled to a hearing on the issue of mental retardation based on a psychology report
that showed that the defendant had an IQ of 80); Mitchell v. State, 886 So. 2d 704 (Miss. 2004)
(finding that the defendant's Atkins claim was without merit, because he served in the military,
attended college for one semester, and was deemed of average intelligence during a two-hour
interview with a clinical psychologist); Ochoa v. State, 136 P.3d 661 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006)
(refusing to disturb the jury's finding that the defendant was not mentally retarded at the time of
the trial, despite evidence that the defendant's IQ was lower at the time the crime was commit-
ted than at the time Of trial and evidence that the defendant learned to read and write while
incarcerated).
43. 854 A.2d 440 (Pa. 2004).
44. Id. at 442-43.
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buried in a salvage yard. 45 Although the court noted that the issue of
Williams's mental retardation was never litigated at trial and recog-
nized that the trial court record could not be used to determine the
issue, it concluded that Williams's death sentence should be affirmed,
because it was "not the product of passion, prejudice, or any other
arbitrary factor. '46 As of 2007, Williams was still on Death Row in
Pennsylvania. 47
In Ex parte Simpson, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's
finding that there was no cognizable claim of mental retardation, de-
spite testimony by a defense expert that the defendant was borderline
mentally retardea. 48 In that case, a jury convicted the defendant and
sentenced him to death for burglarizing and killing an eighty-four-
year-old widow. 49 Simpson, who was twenty at the time, was assisted
by his sixteen-year-old wife, his thirteen-year-old cousin, and his
younger brother.50 The group bound the widow with duct tape and
put her in the trunk of her car after she caught them burglarizing her
home. 51 After driving around with the widow in the trunk for an af-
ternoon while they smoked formaldehyde-laced marijuana cigarettes,
they drove to a river, tied the widow's legs to a cinder block, beat her
with a shovel, and threw her into the river.52
After the state court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing and relied
instead on the written record in denying Simpson state habeas corpus
relief, Simpson tried to submit more evidence into the record-prima-
rily the testimony and report of a psychologist who had found that
Simpson was mentally retarded. 53 Noting the trial court's finding that
the psychologist's affidavit was untimely filed, unpersuasive, and
should not be considered, the appellate court concluded that the trial
45. Id. at 444; see also Michael A. Fuoco, Husband Held for Trial in Stabbing Death of Wife.
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 1, 2000, at B3.
46. Williams, 854 A.2d at 449.
47. CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROJECT, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC., DEATH Row
U.S.A. 57 (Winter 2007), http://www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/pubs/drusa/DRUSAWinter_
2007.pdf.
48. 136 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
49. Id. at 661.
50. Id. at 661-62.
51. Id. at 662.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 662-63. Dr. Windel Dickerson found that Simpson was mildly mentally retarded
and filed his conclusion in an affidavit and videotaped statement. Id. at 662. At the age of
fourteen, Simpson's IQ was 71, but, a year later, he received a score of 78. Id. at 664. A state-
hired psychiatrist concluded that Simpson was not mentally retarded but instead had an antiso-
cial personality disorder. Id. at 665.
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court had not abused its discretion and denied Simpson's mental re-
tardation claim. 54
III. JURY SELECTION IN A CAPITAL CASE
Jury selection in a capital case is far more complicated and difficult
than in a noncapital case. 55 It is beyond the scope of this Article to
fully discuss the negative effects of death qualification or how exclud-
ing people opposed to the death penalty increases the likelihood of
conviction and of decisional errors.5 6 It is clear, however, that the
"process effect" of asking about the death penalty before the question
of guilt or innocence has been determined predisposes the jury to be-
lieve that the defendant is guilty.5 7
Under Witherspoon v. Illinois, the prosecution in a capital case
could exclude for cause anyone who would automatically vote against
giving the death penalty no matter what the circumstances. 5 8 Adams
v. Texas,5 9 as interpreted in Wainwright v. Witt,60 relaxed the "auto-
matic" and "unmistakably clear" language of Witherspoon's footnotes
9 and 21 and found that the proper standard for exclusion for cause
was whether a prospective juror's views on capital punishment "pre-
vent[ed] or substantially impair[ed]" his ability to fulfill his duties. 6 1
While this relaxed the rigors of inquiry on one side of the question
54. Simpson, 136 S.W.3d at 666-67. It did not help that letters written by Simpson from
prison, characterized by the court of appeals as "clear, coherent, and clever," were in the record.
Id. at 666. For example, in these letters Simpson explained to a cousin how to sneak photo-
graphs of his three girlfriends into the prison. Id.
55. Some of this Part is drawn from other writings by the author. See ANDREA D. LYON ET
AL., ILLINOIS CAPITAL DEFENSE MOTIONS AND JURY INSTRUCTIONS MANUAL (2d ed. 2005);
Andrea D. Lyon, Defending the Death Penalty Case: What Makes Death Different?, 42 MERCER
L. REV. 695 (1991); Andrea D. Lyon, Defending the Life-or-Death Case, A.B.A. LITIO. J., Winter
2006, at 45 [hereinafter Lyon, Life-or-Death Case].
56. See Craig Haney, Examining Death Qualification: Further Analysis of the Process Effect, 8
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 133 (1984); Craig Haney, On the Selection of Capital Juries: The Biasing
Effects of the Death-Qualification Process, 8 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 121 (1984).
57. See supra note 56.
58. 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968).
59. 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
60. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
61. Compare Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 515-16 n.9 ("Unless a venireman states unambiguously
that he would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment no matter what
the trial might reveal, it simply cannot be assumed that that is his position."), and id. at 522-23
n.21 ("[N]othing we say today [prevents excluding for cause venirepersons] who made unmistak-
ably clear ... that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment
.... " (emphasis in original)), with Adams, 448 U.S. at 45 ("[A] juror may not be challenged for
cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those views would prevent or substan-
tially impair the performance of his duties as a juror .... (emphasis added)), and Witt, 469 U.S.
at 424 ("[The] standard is whether the jurors views would prevent or substantially impair the
performance of his duties as a juror ...." (emphasis added)).
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somewhat, it complicated matters, because death qualification became
a three-dimensional phenomenon soon after. First, venirepersons
who are "substantially impaired" by virtue of their anti-capital punish-
ment views must be identified. Second, those who are substantially
impaired by virtue of having pro-capital punishment views must also
be identified. 62 Third, those venirepersons who are substantially im-
paired in considering lawful mitigating evidence must be identified. 63
Inquiry into a prospective juror's thoughts and feelings on the death
penalty is a far more complex process than simply asking whether a
juror is for or against capital punishment. It is imperative to discover
if the juror generally favors or opposes the concept and can listen to
and consider both aggravating and mitigating evidence.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, capital defendants have the
right to an impartial jury for trial and sentencing. 64 This constitutional
guarantee includes the right to an adequate voir dire to permit the
identification of unqualified jurors.65 Accordingly, voir dire should as-
certain sufficient information about prospective jurors' beliefs and
opinions to identify those venirepersons whose minds are so closed by
bias that they cannot apply the law as instructed and in accordance
with their oath.
Relevant to this discussion is federal courts' expressed concern
about the influence of racial prejudice in capital sentencing. Begin-
ning with Furman v. Georgia,66 and continuing through McCleskey v.
Kemp,67 the Court has struggled with this issue, acknowledging in Mc-
Cleskey that statistical evidence "indicates a discrepancy that appears
to correlate with race."' 68 While declining to overturn the entire capi-
tal sentencing system due to this improper influence, the Court has
attempted to tackle the problem in other ways. Principal among them
is requiring special procedures in jury selection:
Because of the range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a capital
sentencing hearing, there is a unique opportunity for racial
prejudice to operate but remain undetected. On the facts of this
case, a juror who believes that blacks are violence prone or morally
inferior might well be influenced by that belief in deciding whether
62. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992) (holding that venirepersons must be ques-
tioned regarding potentially disqualifying pro-capital punishment views upon request by
counsel).
63. Id. at 744 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Presumably, under today's decision a juror who
thinks a 'bad childhood' is never mitigating must also be excluded.").
64. Id. at 727-28 (majority opinion); see also U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
65. Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729 (majority opinion).
66. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (plurality opinion).
67. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
68. Id. at 312.
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petitioner's crime involved the aggravating factors specified under
Virginia law. Such a juror might also be less favorably inclined to-
wards petitioner's evidence of mental disturbance as a mitigating
circumstance. More subtle, less consciously held racial attitudes
could also influence a juror's decision in this case. Fear of blacks,
which could easily be stirred up by the violent facts of petitioner's
crime, might incline a juror to favor the death penalty.69
Similarly, courts engaged in capital jury selection should be concerned
with how religion and religious thought affect jurors' decisions about
relative moral culpability. As Sunwolf stated, "[o]nce we realize that
the law says we are entitled to know the 'scruples' of any juror on any
issue relevant to our trial, it is clear that unless we have a working
knowledge of religious beliefs, the right to voir dire cannot be compe-
tently exercised. ' '7°
Studies consistently show that attorneys are far more likely to re-
ceive good information from jurors when they, rather than trial
judges, ask questions. 7t But the U.S. Supreme Court has never held
that judges must allow defense counsel to question prospective ju-
rors.72 However, in recent years, federal courts and many state courts
have begun to recognize the importance of attorney participation in
69. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986) (plurality opinion).
70. SUNWOLF, JURY THINKING 10 (2005); accord State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993)
(upholding a prosecutor's peremptory challenge to a Jehovah's witness); State v. Fuller, 812 A.2d
389 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (holding that having a Muslim sounding name and dressing
as a member of the Muslim faith were sufficient reasons for a peremptory challenge); Casarez v.
State, 913 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc) (upholding the exclusion of two jurors
who were members of the Pentecostal church). All of these decisions occurred in the context of
Batson claims on appeal. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that the racial use
of peremptory challenges is unconstitutional).
71. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY
Standard 15-2.4 (3d ed. 1996); Susan E. Jones, Judge- Versus Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire: An
Empirical Investigation of Juror Candor, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 131 (1987); see also Harold v.
Corwin, 846 F.2d 1148, 1152-54 (8th Cir. 1988) (Lay, C.J., concurring); McGill v. Common-
wealth, 391 S.E.2d 597, 600 (Va. Ct. App. 1990); 2 CRIMINAL PRACTICE MANUAL § 52:5 (2007);
Brent J. Gurney, The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 227, 269-70 (1986); Pam Frasher, Note, Fulfilling Batson and its Progeny: A
Proposed Amendment to Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to Attain a More
Race- and Gender-Neutral Jury Selection Process, 80 IowA L. REV. 1327, 1349-51 (1995).
72. In contrast, some courts have held that constitutional rights are implicated when attorneys
are not allowed to participate in voir dire. See, e.g., Maddux v. State, 825 S.W.2d 511, 514 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1992) ("The right to pose such questions is part of the right to counsel under.., the
Texas constitution." (emphasis added)); see also State v. Hankins, 441 N.W.2d 854, 866 (Neb.
1989) ("The defendant... has the right to put pertinent questions to prospective jurors ....");
Oden v. State, 90 N.W.2d 356, 358 (Neb. 1958) ("The usual and better practice ... is to permit
counsel to conduct the examination under the direction and supervision of the court."); Strube v.
State, 739 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987) ("Rule Six, as well as the ABA Standards
Relating to Trial Courts, § 2.12 (1976) and the ABA Standards for Trial by Jury, § 15-2.4 (1978),
make clear that participation by ... the defense in voir dire, at least in criminal proceedings, is a
right.").
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voir dire.73 It may be unwise and unseemly for a trial judge to pull a
juror in one direction or another,74 for instance, while rehabilitating a
juror who is clearly uncertain of his own views or is, perhaps, even
dissembling.75  More importantly, the judge simply cannot know
enough of the facts from the defense's perspective-or indeed the
prosecution's perspective-to do a thorough job. 7 6
Further, when judges conduct voir dire, they tend to ask leading
questions that cause prospective jurors to agree.7 7 For example, it is
73. See, e.g., United States v. Ible, 630 F.2d 389, 394-95 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Ledee, 549 F.2d 990. 993 (5th Cir. 1977); see also supra note 72. Before the amendment to
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431, a defendant's right to an impartial jury did not include the right
to examine jurors himself. People v. Peeples, 616 N.E.2d 294. 311 (Il1. 1993). However, the rule
now requires judges to allow attorney-conducted voir dire:
The court shall conduct voir dire examination of prospective jurors by putting to them
questions it thinks appropriate, touching upon their qualifications to serve as jurors in
the case at trial. The court may permit the parties to submit additional questions to it
for further inquiry if it thinks they are appropriate and shall permit the parties to sup-
plement the examination by such direct inquiry as the court deems proper for a reason-
able period of time depending upon the length of examination by the court, the
complexity of the case, and the nature of the charges. Questions shall not directly or
indirectly concern matters of law or instructions. The court shall acquaint prospective
jurors with the general duties and responsibilities of jurors.
ILL. Sup. CT. R. 431(a).
74. For example, in State v. Biegenwald, the court found troubling the trial judge's insistence
on "guiding" the potential jurors to the "right" answer:
The suggestion in the colloquy that there is a "correct" answer to the open-ended
question "what are your views on the death penalty?" is most troubling. Although such
an open-ended question is undeniably a proper jumping-off point for death qualifica-
tion, the vapid response "it depends on the circumstances" in no way reduces the need
for additional probing of a venireperson's views on the appropriateness of the sentence
of death. The purpose of voir dire is not to elicit from a potential juror the correct
answer; it is to draw out the potential juror's views, biases, and inclinations and to
provide both counsel and the court the opportunity to assess the venireperson's de-
meanor. We reiterate that voir dire should proceed with the conscious object of provid-
ing court and counsel alike with sufficient information with which to challenge
potential jurors intelligently-whether for cause or peremptorily.
The court's initial open-ended question and variations on the "it depends" response
were too often followed by closed-ended, suggestive questions that, not surprisingly,
elicited the obvious "correct" response.
594 A.2d 172, 192 (N.J. 1991).
75. Citizens are, unfortunately, not always candid during death qualification. They may be
motivated to "get on" or "get off" the jury. See, e.g., Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 676
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the "plurality ... hints that . .. potential jurors may
not have been properly excludable for cause because they were merely feigning objections to
capital punishment in order to avoid jury service"). Although the dissent argued that "the Con-
stitution certainly permits the exclusion for cause of potential jurors who lie under oath about
their views of capital punishment," no one suggests such jurors do not exist. Id. at 676-77.
76. See United States v. Corey, 625 F.2d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 1980) ("This court has previously
stressed that voir dire examination not conducted by counsel has little meaning.").
77. See Cathy E. Bennett, Psychological Methods of Jury Selection in the Typical Criminal
Case, CRIM. DEF., Mar.-Apr. 1977, at 11, 17.
JURY SELECTION POST-ATKINS
common to hear a judge ask, "You can be fair and impartial, can't
you?," to which the obvious appropriate answer is "yes." ' 78 Few jurors
ever dare to disagree. Social science studies suggest that jurors are
acutely aware of even the most subtle cues or indications from the
judge. 79 Fearing the court's disapproval, jurors will usually respond to
the judge's queries in a manner that they believe to be acceptable to
the court without actually considering their own personal, honest
responses.s0
One way to elicit information from prospective jurors is to use a
written questionnaire. There are certain beliefs or opinions that pro-
spective jurors are willing to write about that they simply would not
reveal in the intimidating atmosphere of open court, and a good ques-
tionnaire can assist both parties in honing their follow-up questions.
A capital prosecution demands that exacting standards be met to en-
sure that the entire process is fair.8 a As will be discussed more fully in
the following Part, the need for highly accurate and complete informa-
tion about prospective jurors' attitudes toward mental retardation
makes the need for meaningful attorney-conducted voir dire and the
use of questionnaires paramount.82
IV. SPECIAL CHALLENGES IN REPRESENTING CLIENTS WITH
MENTAL RETARDATION IN CAPITAL JURY SELECTION
Much has been written about the special challenges of representing
clients with disabilities, 83 and there are particular difficulties associ-
ated with representing clients with mental retardation in the criminal
78. Dale W. Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 503,
504 (1965).
79. See Michael T. Nietzel & Ronald C. Dillehay, The Effects of Variations in Voir Dire Proce-
dures in Capital Murder Trials, 6 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1982); Michael T. Nietzel et al., Effects
of Voir Dire Variations in Capital Trials: A Replication and Extension, 5 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 467
(1987); see generally CARL R. ROGERS, CLIENT-CENTERED THERAPY: ITS CURRENT PRACTICE,
IMPLICATIONS, AND THEORY (1951).
80. Note, Judges' Nonverbal Behavior in Jury Trials: A Threat to Judicial Impartiality, 61 VA.
L. REV. 1266, 1275-78 (1975); see also Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 470 (1933) (noting
that "[tihe influence of the trial judge on the jury 'is necessarily and properly of great weight'
and 'his lightest word or intimation is received with deference, and may prove controlling"'
(quoting Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 626 (1894))).
81. Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 584 (1988) ("The fundamental respect for humanity
underlying the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment gives rise
to a special 'need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment' in
any capital case." (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 364 (1977) (White, J., concurring))).
82. See infra notes 83-91 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Stanley S. Herr, Representation of Clients with Disabilities: Issues of Ethics and
Control, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 609 (1989-1990); see also JOHN PARRY, MENTAL
DISABILITY LAW: A PRIMER 17-18 (5th ed. 1995).
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context. First, capital clients may have learned to compensate for a
lack of understanding by acting tough.8 4 Defenders who ask clients to
make decisions about how to proceed or attempt to explain the conse-
quences of two different choices may get a response to the effect of
"F*** a consequence! And f*** you too! I don't give a s*** about no
f***ing consequence!" It is possible that the client is actually angry,
but it is equally (or more) likely that the client does not understand
the meaning of the word "consequence" and that revealing this vul-
nerability would not be consistent with his culture and environment.
The capital defender should be aware that the client is exhibiting a
lack of understanding, not just anger.
Where mental retardation may not be obvious to the defender, who
has had the opportunity to interact personally with the client over a
long period of time, it must be even less obvious to jurors. Many mis-
takenly believe that one can merely look at a person and tell whether
he is mentally retarded.85 In fact, many jurors believe that a person
with mental retardation looks like someone with Down syndrome or
has other facial indicia of his disability, even though this is rarely the
case.
86
Also, as a general matter, death-qualified jurors are hostile to
mental health testimony, defenses, and mitigation. Further, death-
qualified jurors more willingly accept aggravating circumstances than
mitigating factors-many of which involve mental health issues.
87
Death-qualified jurors are also much less likely to accept the insanity
defense, 88 believing it to be a "loophole allowing too many guilty peo-
84. See, e.g., LaJuana Davis, Intelligence Testing and Atkins: Considerations for Appellate
Courts and Appellate Lawyers, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCEss 297, 305-07 (2003) (discussing how
individuals with mental retardation often mask their disabilities by attempting to look and act
like average people); see also Shruti S.B. Desai, Effective Capital Representation of the Mentally
Retarded Defendant, 13 CAP. DEF. J. 251, 265-66 (2001).
85. Desai, supra note 84, at 266-67.
86. Michael L. Perlin. "Life Is in Mirrors, Death Disappears": Giving Life to Atkins, 33 N.M.
L. REV. 315. 334-35 (2003).
87. See James Luginbuhl & Kathi Middendorf, Death Penalty Beliefs and Jurors' Responses to
Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances in Capital Trials, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 263, 279
(1988): see also Brooke M. Butler & Gary Moran, The Role of Death Qualification in Venireper-
sons' Evaluations of Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances in Capital Trials, 26 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 175, 182 (2002) (finding that jurors death-qualified under Witt were more likely to en-
dorse aggravators and jurors excluded under Witt were more likely to believe nonstatutory
mitigators).
88. Phoebe C. Ellsworth et al., The Death-Qualified Jury and the Defense of Insanity, 8 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 81, 92 (1984).
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pie to go free."' 89 So, considering capital murder evidence of mental
retardation is unsurprisingly difficult for the death-qualified jury.
Death-qualified juries have a tendency to believe that, if you cannot
see something, it does not exist.90 But merely asking a question about
that problem will not prompt venirepersons to reveal their biases, just
as one cannot expect to identify racists during voir dire by politely
asking them to raise their hands. Few will publicly admit bias, particu-
larly bias that may be quite unconscious. 9' A capital defender has to
design questions that will make it safe to reveal these biases. No one
wants to be considered unfair-and the safest course is not to speak,
not to reveal what one thinks or feels to avoid the possibility of such a
label. The challenge for the defender is to ask revelatory questions
but not to judge the answer. No one, including the author, is free
from bias, and it is important to keep that in mind. The defender does
not need assent to her own opinion-gaining such assent from the
venire is pointless. Instead, capital defenders need to know what pro-
spective jurors think or feel, what their experiences have been with
persons with mental retardation, how they perceive mental health ex-
perts, and how they will make decisions about whom to believe if
there is conflicting evidence. The only way to find that out is to ask
and to listen to the answers.
V. APPROACHES TO JURY SELECTION WHEN PART OF THE
PROPOSED MITIGATION INCLUDES
MENTAL RETARDATION
In order to speak effectively with jurors about the many sensitive
issues in capital cases, individual, sequestered voir dire is necessary.
In the interests of a fair and impartial trial and due process of law as
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, a searching inquiry must be
made of the prospective jurors to uncover any bias that may exist.
Such an inquiry should be unfettered by natural human reluctance to
admit before fellow jurors that one would be influenced in his verdict
by socially unacceptable feelings or viewpoints. Nowhere is this ten-
89. Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime Control: Death Qualifi-
cation and Jury Attitudes, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 31, 45 (1984).
90. William J. Bowers et al., Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital Sentencing: Jurors' Predisposi-
tions, Guilt-Trial Experience, and Premature Decision Making, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1476,
1498-99 (1998) (finding that jurors focused on details of physical evidence and forensic testing).
91. See SUNWOLF, supra note 70, at 30-31 (discussing an "implicit association interactive test,"
which may reveal a person's unconscious biases); see also SUNWOLF, PRACTICAL JURY DYNAM-
iCs: FROM ONE JUROR'S TRIAL PERCEPTIONS TO THE GRoUP's DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES
162-63 (2004) (noting that, while most jurors' prejudices are unconscious or unclaimed, they can
be easily activated).
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dency to give socially acceptable answers more pronounced than when
the issue involves potential jurors' attitudes toward capital punish-
ment, mitigation in general, and mental health issues, including
mental retardation. Individual, sequestered voir dire permits the par-
ties to uncover the information needed to convince the court to ex-
clude venirepersons for cause.92 Indeed, some courts now require
individual, sequestered questioning on at least capital punishment re-
lated questions.93
After all, it is not only the facts of a case, but also how people feel
about those facts that count. Needless to say, how jurors feel about
the facts is profoundly affected by who they are. The process of jury
selection is nearly as important as the results of that selection, particu-
larly in a death penalty case. "Jury selection has three main goals: 1)
to elicit information from jurors, 2) to educate jurors on the defense
case and defuse the prosecutor's case, and 3) to establish a relation-
ship between the jurors and the defense attorney and his client. '94
Perhaps the single most important thing a lawyer can do in further-
ance of these goals is to listen. Some psychologists refer to this skill as
attending behavior, and it includes a relaxed, attentive posture, eye
contact, and verbal following. 95 Verbal following is paying attention
to the path that the prospective juror's answers are taking, noticing
and following up on gaps in that path, and ensuring that the meanings
of words that may be subjective are ascertained. For example, if a
juror says he has no experience with mental retardation but then says,
"I think they should bring back the short bus at schools though," there
is a gap. Is the juror trying to be funny? Is he referring to some inci-
dent between a behaviorally disturbed child and his child? The ques-
tioner needs to recognize that gap and then ask nonjudgmental and
open-ended questions. As previously stated, listening is key.
But listen to what? What questions should the capital defender ask,
and how should she ask them? This depends on a number of factors,
the most central of which is the theory of the case, including the the-
ory of mitigation. One of the major differences between trial prepara-
92. See Nietzel & Dillehay, supra note 79; Nietzel et al., supra note 79.
93. In Ferguson v. Commonwealth, the court held that "separate examination of jurors or
prospective jurors in circumstances of potential prejudice is a matter of procedural policy." 512
S.W.2d 501, 503 (Ky. 1974). The court went on to "suggest to the trial courts that they give
thought to the use of separate examination of jurors in appropriate circumstances." Id. at 503
n.I. See also Hovey v. Superior Court, 616 P.2d 1301, 1354 (Cal. 1980) (stating that, in capital
cases, the "portion of the voir dire of each prospective juror which deals with issues which in-
volve death-qualifying the jury should be done individually and in sequestration").
94. Bennett, supra note 77, at 11.
95. ALLEN E. IVEY, MICROCOUNSELING: INNOVATIONS IN INTERVIEw TRAINING 35-44
(1971).
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tion in a capital case and a noncapital case is that the theory of the
case must work with the theory of mitigation. 96 Some theories of the
case flow easily into the sentencing phase. For example, if the defense
is insanity, the mitigation presentation will likely be an extension of
the defense at trial. If the capital defendant is convicted of felony
murder-say in the course of an armed robbery where the victim went
for the gun-part of the mitigation may focus on the unintentional
nature of the crime.97 If the case had a vigorous "wrong guy" defense,
the capital defender must face up to the fact that the jury rejected that
defense and then present mitigation to the jury out of respect for the
awesome challenge facing them-choosing punishment.
In a case where mitigation relies in whole or in part upon evidence
of the defendant's mental retardation, there is an extra challenge-the
generally held belief that a person who can stop for a red light, run
from a crime, or lie to escape punishment cannot be mentally re-
tarded. 98 Of course this is not true-most seven-year-olds know to
stop for a red light and will try to get out of being punished for a
transgression, but society does not hold them to the same behavioral
standards as twenty-five-year-olds. The challenge is to find a way to
communicate this to a jury, sound out their feelings, and not offend
them by patronizing them or, worse, judging their answers.
Jury selection is not the time to lecture. It is the time to learn and
gently awaken the jury to certain issues; but the jurors are the center
of the process, not the lawyer. The venire should be informed, prefer-
ably by the trial judge, that the only good juror is an open and honest
one and that some might be great jurors for one case but not for an-
other, simply because they are the products of their life experiences.
The attorney should communicate empathy, respect, and congru-
96. See Lyon, Life-or-Death Case, supra note 55.
97. For example, it is felony murder even if the victim died of a heart attack during an armed
robbery, but it is not the cold-blooded "worst of the worst" case one thinks as deserving of the
death penalty.
98. The Atkins Court explained as follows:
Because of their impairments, however, by definition [persons with mental retardation]
have diminished capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to
abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to
control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others. There is no evidence that
they are more likely to engage in criminal conduct than others, but there is abundant
evidence that they often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan,
and that in group settings they are followers rather than leaders. Their deficiencies do
not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their personal
culpability.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304. 318 (2002).
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ence. 99 Unfortunately, attorneys often employ techniques that have
closing effects.1 00 Closing effects are exactly what they sound like:
they hinder communication and prevent learning what the true opin-
ions and feelings of the prospective juror are.101
Carl Rogers tells us that each person has worth and dignity in his
own right.10 2 This is an important attitude to have in voir dire so that
the questioner's responses are empathic, not judgmental. For in-
stance, suppose the case involves the use of a handgun (an issue that
has enormous emotional response from the citizenry), and, when the
attorney asks a juror about his feelings about handguns, he states that
"Handguns are why there is so much crime." If the questioner's re-
sponse is "so you're against handguns," the questioner has labeled the
juror and judged him. Whether the judgment is good or bad is irrele-
vant, because the other jurors have seen this and it is likely to make
them uncomfortable. This response is also problematic, because it
leaves no room for the juror to respond. A response like "I get the
feeling that handguns make you feel afraid or nervous, am I right?" is
much more likely to get information, and the attorney will not have
judged and possibly cut off communication with this potential juror.
Good manners are also very important, and the questioner should
not be too familiar with a prospective juror.10 3 While we are in a first-
name society these days, this should not extend to the jurors. In addi-
tion, while one must rely to some extent on the demographic data one
has (for instance, knowledge of a prospective juror's neighborhood),
stereotypes are dangerous. Perhaps because of the pressure of having
to screen a large number of people in so short a time, many attorneys
99. There are four ways to do this. The first is self-disclosure. Jurors will feel more comforta-
ble telling you what they feel if you give them permission to by talking about how you feel
(briefly, or you will get stopped by the judge or prosecutor). The second method of effective
juror-centered voir dire is the use of open-ended questions accompanied by open body language.
Jurors have no trouble hearing what the "right" answer is if they are asked close-ended questions
or asked with the questioner's opinion obviously displayed in voice or manner. The third
method is reflection. This means reflecting back to jurors what the questioner perceives them to
be feeling, thus giving jurors assurance that the questioner is listening and giving them permis-
sion to continue to speak. If it is not clear what jurors are feeling or thinking, the fourth method,
clarification, should be employed. Attorneys should not think that because they mean one thing
by a certain word or phrase that jurors think the same thing. See Bennett, supra note 77, at
16-17.
100. They include (1) close-ended questions; (2) false reassurance (telling jurors not to feel
what they feel); (3) advice (which makes jurors feel belittled or condescended); and (4) interpre-
tation (analysis of jurors' behavior). Id. at 17-19.
101. See id.
102. See generally ROGERS, supra note 79.
103. JOHN BRADY, THE CRAFr OF INTERVIEWING 49 (1976) ("The interviewer should try to
build an atmosphere of mutual trust and respect, or risk ruptured communication.").
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during voir dire rely upon hunches, jumping to conclusions that have
little or no basis in fact.10 4
It is important to ask the prospective jurors simple and clear ques-
tions about their conceptions of mental retardation and if they see a
difference between legal responsibility and moral culpability. 10 5 Simi-
larly, attorneys should not follow up the wrong answer with a correc-
tive leading question, such as "if the judge told you that a person can
be mentally retarded without it showing physically and that mental
retardation is mitigation, could you follow that instruction?" Ques-
tions like this only get assent, not information. A better follow up
would be "Sometimes things can be seen with the naked eye, and
sometimes they cannot. Can you think of some examples where that
might be true?" Then, assuming that the juror can think of some ex-
amples, his answer will help the attorney make decisions on how to
proceed.
CONCLUSION
If the questioner does a good job of asking open-ended, nonjudg-
mental questions, it should be possible to ferret out prospective jurors'
biases and misconceptions. This will allow the capital defender to in-
telligently exercise peremptory challenges, make cogent strikes for
cause, and, most importantly, communicate effectively with those who
have the client's life in their hands.
104. Richard Fear explains as follows:
Many [people], for example, have a temptation to classify people according to physical
appearance. [An attorney] may jump to the conclusion that the man with the square
jaw is a person with great determination, [that someone] with red hair has a hot temper,
or that the individual with eyes set rather close together is not to be trusted. Many
studies, of course, have shown that such conclusions have not the slightest validity.
RICHARD A. FEAR, THE EVALUATION INTERVIEw 35 (1973) (alterations in original).
105. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-19 (2002).
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APPENDIX
Sample Questionnaire for Jurors Regarding Mental Retardation
1. Have you, or has someone close to you, ever known a person with
mental retardation? _Yes No
a) If your answer was yes, can you please tell us about that person
and what his or her relationship is to you?
b) If your answer was no, can you please tell us what you know
about mental retardation?
2. Do you think mental retardation shows on a person's face?
Yes No
Please explain your answer:
3. Do you think some people are more responsible for their actions
than others? Yes No
Why do you feel the way that you do?
4. Have you heard the term "abuse excuse"? -Yes No
If your answer was yes, what does that phrase mean to you?
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5. Why do you think some people express more emotion than others?
6. Have you ever had the occasion to work with or professionally con-
sult a mental health professional (psychiatrist, psychologist, social
worker, or other counselor)? -Yes No
a) If your answer was yes, please explain.
b) If your answer was no, what are your thoughts or feelings about
people who do consult mental health professionals?
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